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ABSTRACT
Combining Dynamic and Static Analysis for Malware Detection
by Anusha Damodaran
Well-designed malware can evade static detection techniques, such as signature
scanning. Dynamic analysis strips away one layer of obfuscation and hence such an
approach can potentially provide more accurate detection results. However, dynamic
analysis is generally more costly than static analysis. In this research, we analyze
the effectiveness of using dynamic analysis to enhance the training phase, while using
only static techniques in the detection phase. Relative to a fully static approach, the
additional overhead is minimal, since training is essentially one-time work.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
“Malware is any kind of software intentionally developed for malicious purposes
without user’s awareness” [17]. Malware continues to be widespread despite the use
of anti-virus software. There are many kinds of malware such as virus, botnet, worm,
trojan, spyware etc., which is discussed in Chapter 2 in detail.
As per the 2015 Symantec Internet Security Report [45] which was released in
April, more than 317 million new pieces of malware were created in the year 2014
alone, 26 percent more than the malware variants in 2013. Up to 28 percent of these
were virtual machine aware. Out of which some like W32.Crisis not only are virtual
machine aware, but also checks for other virtual machine images and infects them.
Also, in 2014, the number of malicious spam emails surged from a mere seven percent
in October to 41 percent in November. Most of these emails used Downloader.Upatre
and Downloader.Ponik which are well known trojans that download other malware
like Trojan.Zbot into compromised systems. Also, it is found that in virtualized
environments, malware instead of quitting, started to exhibit behavior similar to
benign software to avoid detection.
Due to the increasing number of new and unknown malware every year, analysis
and detection of malware has been the prime research area these days. Various
approaches are used for both analysis and detection of malware. The most commonly
used method for the detection of malware is signature based detection. Anti-virus
software widely use signature based detection methods which rely on exact signature
matching. The main disadvantage of signature based detection is that it is only useful
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for an already known malware attack. It is ineffective while detecting new malware or
even variants of existing malware whose signatures have not been generated yet [17,
18].
A large number of malware use simple techniques such as code obfuscation, en-
cryption to evade signature based detection. Due to the inefficiency of signature based
detection for a new malware outbreak, malware researchers started focusing on using
behavior based detection methods for the unknown malware attack.
Behavior based detection methods identifies the actions performed by the mal-
ware instead of syntactic markers like signatures [25]. Hence behavior based detection
methods have large processing overheads than signature based detection methods. A
few behavior based malware detection techniques have already been proposed in prior
literature. A majority of these proposed techniques rely on extracting unique pat-
terns from the instruction, system or API call graphs. The detection is typically
done by graph matching algorithms, similarity based algorithms or sub-graph based
features [28]. In addition to the above detection techniques, there are several other
detection techniques which are discussed in Chapter 2.
These detection techniques primarily make use of analysis techniques to analyze
a given malware and understand the intention of a malware [16]. There are three
different approaches for malware analysis such as static, dynamic and hybrid analysis.
Static analysis is analyzing a software without executing the software [29]. Static
analysis usually involves disassembling a software and analyzing the opcode sequences,
the control flow graphs. Other techniques involve analyzing the file characteristics, the
byte codes from the executable file. Whereas, Dynamic analysis is analyzing the tasks
performed by a program while it is being executed [16] in a virtualized environment.
Dynamic analysis strips away one layer of obfuscation and hence such an approach can
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potentially provide more accurate detection results. There are several techniques and
approaches followed to perform dynamic analysis which will be discussed in Chapter 2.
On top of these two techniques, there is one more analysis technique which is the
hybrid analysis of malware which combines the advantages of both static and dynamic
analysis [36]. In hybrid analysis, static analysis is done before execution of a program
and then dynamic analysis is done selectively based on the information obtained from
static analysis. Refer to Chapter 2 for more elaborate overview on analysis techniques.
The main concern as per Symantec is that, the attackers have been constantly
upgrading their stealth techniques while security companies are still fighting old tac-
tics [45]. There is a need to come up with more accurate detection techniques without
compromising the efficiency. In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of using dy-
namic analysis to enhance the training phase, while using only static techniques in
the detection phase. Relative to a fully static approach, the additional overhead is
minimal, since training is essentially one-time work. Also, in this approach scoring
applies only the static approach which is faster. We use statistical based detection
approach which has been used in the past and has been proven to give better results
than commonly used detection approaches.
This paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the various types
of malware, provide background information on malware detection techniques and
malware analysis techniques and discuss about the various tools used for malware
analysis. In Chapter 3, we provide the implementation details of the project. In
Chapter 4, we discuss the details of the experiments and analyze the results obtained.
In Chapter 5, we conclude by giving the summary of results and discuss the possible
future work.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
Malware or Malicious Software as described in Chapter 1 either stops normal
execution of benign programs or they start executing along with benign code to do
malicious activities.
In this chapter, we describe some of the commonly known types of malware in
the first section. In the second section, we discuss some of the well known malware
detection techniques and elaborate on Hidden Markov Models. In the third section,
we discuss the different malware analysis methods and elaborate previous work on
malware detection. In the final section, we discuss the different malware analysis
tools that are being used.
2.1 Types of Malware
There are several types of malware which can be differentiated by their charac-
teristics such as the execution pattern, their internal structure and their method of
propagation. They are as follows.
2.1.1 Virus
A virus is a type of malware that self-replicates into other existing executable
programs. The infected code follows the same pattern to infect other existing code.
Viruses spread within a computer or can travel to other computers via external media
such as USB, CD/DVD, floppy disk, etc., [6]. Viruses cannot propagate through net-
works. A separate term ‘worm’ is used for malware that propagate through networks.
Viruses can also be classified with respect to their concealment strategy as encrypted,
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polymorphic and metamorphic malware.
2.1.1.1 Encrypted Virus
Encrypted virus is a type of malware where, the entire body of malware is en-
crypted by using any of the known encryption techniques. The Code to decrypt the
above created encrypted malware is also attached to its body. Signature based detec-
tion method fails to detect encrypted malware since the signature cannot be extracted
from the malware. The malware body is decrypted only at the time of execution. Al-
though, signature for the decryption code which is present in the executable itself can
be used to detect such malware.
2.1.1.2 Polymorphic Virus
In polymorphic virus, the code to decrypt malware is morphed after every in-
fection. Morphing is done in such a way that the internal structure of code changes
completely without any change in the functionality [34]. This overcomes the disadvan-
tage of encrypted malware and signature based detection becomes quite impossible
in this case.
2.1.1.3 Metamorphic Virus
Metamorphic virus is an advanced version of polymorphic virus. In this malware,
internal structure of the malware changes after every execution. But, the overall func-
tionality remains the same [27]. Various approaches are used to morph the internal
structure of the malware.
Subroutines Permutation In this method, malware writers rearrange the subrou-
tine definitions within the code, while maintaining the ordering of subroutine
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calls. This generates code that are functionally equivalent but structurally dif-
ferent.
Instruction Reordering Here, instructions are rearranged in a program as long as
they satisfy the inter-instruction dependencies. That is, the instructions that
are independent of previous instructions can be reordered to generate morphed
copies [6, 34].
Instruction Equivalence Here, an instruction or a sequence of instructions are
replaced by its functionally equivalent instruction to generate new variants of
the same code [49].
Register Renaming This is the most simplest code obfuscation technique where we
can simply rename all registers that are used and generate morphed copies [6].
Inserting Junk Code In this method, do-nothing instructions are inserted in soft-
ware which will not affect the execution of program [13]. These do-nothing
instructions are junk code or dead code that are added to facilitate code obfus-
cation.
Some of the other techniques include subroutine interleaving where subroutines
are either merged or split to generate morphed copies or making spaghetti code where
a lot of jump and go-to instructions are used. All of these techniques combined can
be used successfully to generate quite a large number of morphed code copies [6].
2.1.2 Worm
A worm is similar to a virus in many ways. Worms also self-replicate them-
selves. The two distinct differences between worms and viruses are that worms are
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stand-alone. They do not need existing executable code to infect. Also, worms can
propagate through networks unlike viruses which need existing programs to help them
propagate. A well known worm in the 80s is the Morris worm that crippled the in-
ternet for a certain duration of time [6].
2.1.3 Trojan
A Trojan is a type of malware which camouflages itself as a benign program
but secretly performs hidden malicious activity. A classic example of a Trojan would
be the password login program which prompts the username and password for an
application and keylogs the password in the background. Then, it would flash an
‘invalid password’ message and then display the actual username, password prompt
page [6]. Another example for a Trojan would be fake anti-virus programs that claim
to remove viruses when in fact it performs malicious activity in the background.
Some examples of Trojan viruses that are used in this research are Trojan.Zbot [47],
Trojan.ZeroAccess [48], Trojan.Cleaman [46] etc.
2.1.4 Backdoor
A Backdoor is a mechanism which bypasses a normal security check [6]. One
example of Backdoor that we use in this research is Harebot. Harebot.Backdoor
allows to gain remote access to the infected system. It attempts to perform stealth
activities to lock resources and affects the productivity of the system. It cannot
propagate automatically on its own [24].
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2.2 Detection Techniques
There are several detection techniques commonly used to detect a malware. The
various characteristics of malware are extracted and used in detection techniques
such as statistical analysis on opcode sequences, pattern mining or similarity based
techniques etc.,. Some of the popular techniques are discussed as follows.
2.2.1 Signature Based Detection
Signature based detection is the commonly used malware detection technique in
anti-virus software. A signature is a sequence of bytes that is unique to a particular
malware which is constructed by security experts after analyzing the malware. Anti-
virus software maintain a large repository of signatures of known malware [6]. These
repositories are updated frequently to keep it up-to date. To detect whether an
executable is benign or malware, the executable is matched with the signatures present
in the database using signature matching algorithms like Aho-Corasick algorithm,
Veldman algorithm, Wu-Manber algorithm etc.,. Signature based detection scheme
is simple and fast [44]. The drawback of this technique is that it requires up-to
date signature database. It cannot detect new variants of malware whose signatures
are not present in the repository. Simple obfuscation techniques like metamorphism,
polymorphism can be used to evade signature based detection [32].
2.2.2 Behavior Based Detection
Behavior based detection mainly focuses on the actions performed by the mal-
ware during execution and understanding the intent of the malware using various
techniques. In behavior based detection, the behavior of the malware and benign
files are studied during the training(learning phase) and then during the monitoring
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phase, the executable is either classified as malware or benign. A slight variation
gives rise to anomaly based detection wherein the behavior of all files are studied in
the training phase, and during the monitoring phase any file which is deviated from
normal behavior is classified as infected [25].
2.2.3 Statistical Based Detection
Statistical based detection has been very successful in recent times for malware
detection. Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is one such statistical analysis method
which is used to detect malware [43]. In this Project, we use HMM for malware
detection. Hence HMM is explained in detail in upcoming sections.
2.2.3.1 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov Models are generally used for statistical based pattern analysis.
They are used in most of the speech recognition systems and in numerous applica-
tions in computational molecular biology, pattern recognition, artificial intelligence
and malware detection [22]. In the following sections, we will give brief introduc-
tion on HMM and its usage in malware detection. A Hidden Markov Model is a
machine learning model to represent probability distributions over sequence of obser-
vations [22]. The Hidden Markov Model has two significant properties from which it
attained its name. The first property is that it assumes that the observation at time
t was generated by some process whose state 𝑆𝑡 is hidden from the observer. Second,
it satisfies the markov property i.e., the current state 𝑆𝑡 is dependent only on 𝑆𝑡−1
and is independent of all states prior to t-1. A generic Hidden Markov Model is given
in Figure 1 [43].
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𝐵 𝐵 𝐵 𝐵
Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model
The notation used in HMM is as follows [43].
𝑇 = length of the observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of observation symbols
𝑄 = {𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑁−1} = distinct states of the Markov process
𝑉 = {0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1} = set of possible observations
𝐴 = state transition probabilities
𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝒪 = (𝒪0,𝒪1, . . . ,𝒪𝑇−1) = observation sequence.
Every state in an Hidden Markov Model represents a probability distribution of
sequence of observations. The transition between states have fixed probabilities [43].
We train HMM using observation sequences that represent a particular dataset. We
can then match an observation sequence against the model that was trained using
HMM to determine it’s score which is the probability of the occurrence of the observa-
tion in a given model. If the probability is high, then the scored observation sequence
is very similar to the trained model. If the probability is less, then the observation
sequence is very different to the trained model. A Hidden Markov Model is defined by
the matrices 𝜋, 𝐴 and 𝐵. It is denoted by 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) [3, 43]. The three problems
that can be solved using an HMM are [3, 43],
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Problem 1: Given a HMM 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, determine
𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). This is to determine the likelihood of the sequence given the model.
Problem 2: Given a HMM 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, determine
the optimal state sequence for the markov process. Here, we uncover the hidden
part of the HMM.
Problem 3: Given an observation sequence 𝒪, 𝑁 and 𝑀 , determine the model 𝜆 =
(𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) that maximizes the probability of 𝒪. Here, we determine a model that
best fits the observation data.
In this project, we use Problem 1 and Problem 3. Problem 3 is used while training
the observation sequences obtained from malware data to determine a model. Problem
1 is used to determine the log likelihood of the observation sequence obtained from
either the malware or benign file which is used for testing. The score obtained from
Problem 3 is used to determine if the observation sequence is similar to the trained
model or not. If there is a significant difference in scores obtained from malware and
benign files, then a threshold could be determined to classify the file either as malware
or benign.
To solve the above mentioned problems, we have a few well known algorithms [43]
such as,
∙ Forward Algorithm
∙ Backward Algorithm
∙ Baum-Welch Algorithm
11
An overview of the above algorithms as seen in [43] in given below. The forward
algorithm, also known as 𝛼 pass, can be used to solve Problem 1. It is used to
determine 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). The algorithm is stated as follows [43].
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1
𝛼𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪0,𝒪1, . . . ,𝒪𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖|𝜆)
Here, 𝛼𝑡(𝑖) is the probability of the observation sequence up to time 𝑡. The
probability of the complete sequence is then calculated as follows.
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, let
𝛼0(𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖𝑏𝑖(𝒪0)
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, calculate
𝛼𝑡(𝑖) =
[︃
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝛼𝑡−1(𝑗)𝑎𝑗𝑖
]︃
𝑏𝑖(𝒪𝑡)
Then the probability is given by,
𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑖=0
𝛼𝑇−1(𝑖)
The backward algorithm, or 𝛽 pass is used to find the most likely state sequence.
The algorithm is as follows [43].
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 − 1
𝛽𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪𝑡+1,𝒪𝑡+2, . . . ,𝒪𝑇−1, 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖, 𝜆)
Then, 𝛽𝑡(𝑖) is calculated as follows.
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For 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, let
𝛽𝑇−1(𝑖) = 1
For 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 2, 𝑇 − 3, . . . , 0 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, calculate
𝛽𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗(𝒪𝑡+1)𝛽𝑡+1(𝑗)
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) is defined as
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖|𝒪, 𝜆)
Then, 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) is given as,
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) = 𝛼𝑡(𝑖)𝛽𝑡(𝑖)/𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆)
In all likelihood, the state at time 𝑡 is 𝑞𝑖 where 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) is maximum.
To solve Problem 3, we have to adjust the parameters of the model 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 to
best fit the observations. N, the number of states and M, the number of observation
symbols are fixed, but The model parameters 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 has to be determined
in every iteration of the hill-climb with the row stochastic condition. Baum-Welch
algorithm helps in effectively re-estimating the parameters [43].
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇−1 and 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 𝑁−1}, the di-gammas are defined
as,
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖, 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑞𝑗|𝒪, 𝜆).
The di-gammas is the probability of transitioning from state 𝑞𝑖 at time 𝑡 to state 𝑞𝑗
at time 𝑡+ 1. It is written as,
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛼𝑡(𝑖)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗(𝒪𝑡+1)𝛽𝑡+1(𝑗)/𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆).
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The relation between di-gammas and 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) is given by,
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)
Problem 3 can then be solved by the following steps [43].
∙ Initialize 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋). We choose random values instead of uniform values to
escape the local maximum during the hill climb process. The values are chosen
such that 𝜋𝑖 ≈ 1/𝑁 , 𝐴𝑖𝑗 ≈ 1/𝑁 and 𝐵𝑗𝑘 ≈ 1/𝑀 .
∙ Then, calculate 𝛼𝑡(𝑖), 𝛽𝑡(𝑖), 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) and 𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) as above.
∙ Re-estimate the parameters 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 as follows.
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, let
𝜋 = 𝛾0(𝑖)
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, calculate
𝑎𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖)
For 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑘 = 0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1, calculate
𝑏𝑗(𝑘) =
∑︁
𝑡∈0,1,...,𝑇−1,𝒪𝑡=𝑘
𝛾𝑡(𝑗)
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑗)
∙ If probability 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) increases, then repeat from step 2.
We can stop the process when 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) does not increase by some predetermined
threshold or when it reaches the maximum number of iterations [43].
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2.2.3.2 Malware Detection Using Hidden Markov Model
Now, we will look at the basic steps followed for performing malware detection
using Hidden Markov Model. First, we select the observation data that the model
should be trained for. In this case, the observation sequences represent a set of mal-
ware data. The observation sequences can be API calls sequence or opcode sequences.
A model is trained with the above observation sequences. This can be related with
Problem 3. After convergence, we get an accurate model that best fits the observation
sequences.
Next, we score a set of malware and benign files against the trained model. If
the scores are separated with the help of a predetermined threshold, the scores above
the threshold can be said to be files from the malware family and ones that are below
the threshold can be said to be files from the benign family. The above method
needs a predetermined threshold to classify between malware and benign files. The
accuracy of the detection method is then calculated depending on the number of
correct classifications. The above approach in calculating accuracy in practice is not
a good idea. A better approach would be to compute AUC to determine the accuracy.
An AUC score close to 1.0 is the best score. More details on this can be found at [52].
In Chapter 3, we shall see how HMM has been used for malware detection in this
project in detail.
2.3 Analysis Techniques
The three main malware analysis techniques are static, dynamic and hybrid
analysis. Each analysis method has its own advantages and disadvantages which has
been discussed in this section.
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2.3.1 Static Analysis
Static analysis is the analysis of a software performed without actually executing
the program [16]. Various approaches are followed to perform static analysis. Some
of them are based on the characteristics of the binary file itself, by extracting byte
code sequences from the binary, by extracting opcode sequences after disassembling
the binary file, by extracting control flow graph from the assembly file, by extracting
API calls from the binary and so on. Each represents a feature set and any one or a
combination is used for malware detection.
In [10], the authors presented a technique to detect malicious behavior in exe-
cutables using static analysis. They generate an annotated CFG of an executable and
make use of an automaton that represents malicious code to detect malware. Their
approach focuses on detecting obfuscation patterns in malware and succeed at that
by showing good accuracy.
In recent years, detection of metamorphic malware has been very much effective
due to the application of Markov models to malware detection as discussed before.
Profile Hidden Markov Models(PHMM) is known for their success in determining
relations between DNA and protein sequences. When applied for malware detection it
has been found that Profile Hidden Markov Models can effectively detect metamorphic
malware [43]. HMM has also been successful in this regard. In [3], HMM was also
used for malware classification.
In [14], the malware detection is done based on function call graph analysis.
In [41], opcode-based similarity measure was developed similar to simple substitution
cryptanalysis method. The paper shows excellent results for metamorphic malware
detection.
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In [40], the corresponding advantages of API call sequences and assembly code
are combined and a similarity based matrix is produced that determines whether a
portion of code has traces of a particular malware. Two detection methods that have
been discussed in this paper are SAVE(Static Analyser for Vicious Executables) that
focuses on assembly calls and MEDiC(Malware Examiner using Disassembled Code)
that uses API calls for analysis.
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic Analysis is the analysis of a software performed while executing the
program [16]. Some of the information that can be obtained by dynamic analysis are
API calls, system calls, instruction traces, taint analysis, registry changes, memory
writes etc.,. Some of the malware detection techniques using dynamic analysis which
has been researched in the past are as follows.
In [26], the authors presented a malware detection technique using dynamic anal-
ysis where fine-grained models are built to capture the behavior of malware using
system calls information and use a scanner to match the activity of any unknown
program against these models to classify them as either benign or malware. The be-
havior models are represented in the form of graphs. The vertices denote the system
calls and the edges denote the dependency between the calls where the input of one
system call(vertex) depends on the output of another system call(vertex).
In [1], the authors propose a run-time monitoring based malware detection tool
that extracts statistical features from malware using spatio-temporal information from
API call logs. The spatial information is the arguments and return values of the API
calls and temporal information is the sequence of the API calls. This information
is used to build formal models that are fed to standard machine learning algorithms
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for malware detection. In [17], a set of program API calls is extracted and combined
with the control flow graphs to obtain a new model API-CFG where API calls form
the edges in the control flow graph. This API-CFG is trained by a learning model
and used as a classifier during the testing stage for malware detection. In a slightly
modified version, [19] they apply n-grams method to the API calls extracted and
used the above as a feature set for malware classification. In [23], dynamic malware
detection is done using registers values set analysis.
Some of the works focus on kernel memory mapping to develop a malware behav-
ior monitor while analyzing kernel execution traces [35]. The authors in [30] propose
a faster and effective method for malware classification using detection of maximum
common subgraph algorithms.
In [53], the API sequences are extracted from a PE file and OOA based mining
is done for malware classification. In [33], malware is analyzed by abstracting the
frequent itemsets in API call sequences. In [31], a kernel object behavioral graph is
created and graph isomorphism techniques and weighted common graph technique is
used to calculate the hotpath for each malware family. And the unknown malware is
then classified into whichever malware family has similar hotpaths.
In [12], dynamic instruction sequences are logged and are converted to abstract
assembly blocks. Data mining algorithms are used to build a classification model
using feature vectors extracted from the above data. For detection, the same method
is used and scored against the classification model.
In [2], the authors propose a malware detection technique that uses instruction
trace logs of executables collected dynamically. These traces are then constructed as
graphs. The instructions are considered as nodes and the data from the instruction
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trace is used to calculate the transition probabilities. Then a similarity matrix is
generated between the constructed graphs using different graph kernels. Finally, the
constructed similarity matrix is fed to a SVM for classification.
From all the research given above, it is evident that dynamic analysis can be
viewed as a good source of information on malware behavior. Even though, they incur
an execution overhead, an accurate model can be obtained from dynamic analysis.
Also, the research has shown good results by using API call sequences and Opcode
sequences to give almost a perfect description of the behavior of a malware.
2.3.3 Hybrid Analysis
Hybrid analysis technique is the combination of static and dynamic analysis
techniques. Dynamic analysis can be tedious due to multi-path execution. Static
analysis can be used to selectively choose the path of execution for dynamic analysis
and hence can increase accuracy and efficiency [36].
In [9], the authors propose an innovative framework for classification of malware
using both static and dynamic analysis. They define features or characteristics of mal-
ware as Mal-DNA(Malware DNA). Mal-DNA combines static, dynamic and hybrid
characteristics. Their framework contains three components:
1. Static Analyzer using various techniques - START extracts the static charac-
teristics of malware.
2. Debugging-based behavior monitor and analyzer - DeBON extracts hybrid and
dynamic characteristics of them.
3. CLassifier using Mal-DNA - CLAM classifies malware based on extracted Mal-
DNA from 1 and 2 using machine learning algorithms.
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2.3.3.1 HDM-Analyser
In [18], the authors develop HDM Analyser where they use both static analysis
and dynamic analysis techniques in the training phase and perform only static analysis
in the testing phase. The authors mainly focus on taking the advantage of accuracy of
the dynamic analysis and the advantage of time complexity from static analysis. By
combining the static and dynamic analysis techniques, they have showed that HDM-
Analyser has better overall accuracy and time complexity than static and dynamic
analysis methods [18]. The authors extracted a sequence of API calls for dynamic
analysis data which is one of the most effective feature which can describe the behavior
of a program perfectly.
Instead of using both dynamic and static analysis as used in [18], in this project
only dynamic analysis techniques has been used to train the learning model. We then
score the observation data obtained from static analysis. Since the results obtained
from malware detection using HMM has been consistently good, HMM is used to test
the technique here.
2.4 Tools used for Dynamic and Static Analysis
Elaborate details and links to all tools are given in the RCE Tool Library [11].
The library consists of disassemblers, debuggers, obfuscation tools, decompilers, etc.,.
Some of the tools that are used to perform both dynamic and static analysis on Win32
files are given below.
IDA Pro is one of the best disassembler that generates near to accurate assembly
language source code from executable code. It can also be used as a debugger. It
supports various file formats and also uses IDC scripts and IDA Python scripts
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to help in debugging. The features ‘function tracing’ and ‘instruction tracing’
enables to log all instruction executions and function calls. In this project, we
use IDA Pro to generate .asm files from which opcodes and windows API calls
can be extracted. Also, we use IDA Pro to collect the instruction trace logs of
executables.
OllyDbg is a 32-bit disassembler and debugger, which is second best to IDA Pro.
OllyDbg has limited features compared to IDA Pro.
2.4.1 Dynamic Analysis Tools
Some of the dynamic analysis tools that are free of cost or open source tools that
can be used to extract API calls or instruction execution logs are as follows.
Ether malware analysis tool is an open source tool that has been developed via
hardware virtualization extensions, and resides completely outside of the tar-
get OS. This enables no in-guest software components detection and hence no
problems of incomplete or inaccurate emulation. Most of the recent viruses can
detect a debugger or a virtual environment during execution. Ether malware
analysis tool successfully overcomes the above problem and hence been a great
tool for research purposes [15].
API Logger is a simple tool that logs all API calls that satisfy the inclusion and
exclusion list. The inclusion list specifies which libraries need to be included
and exclusion list specifies which libraries or functions can be ignored [20].
WinAPIOverride is an advanced API monitoring software. It tries to fill the gap
between classic API monitoring software and debuggers. It can be very useful to
manually extract API calls by deciding the flow of the program during execution.
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API Monitor is a software that also helps in monitoring and controlling API calls
made by applications of processes. This tool needs to be run inside a virtual ma-
chine to analyze a malware and cannot be run in a sandboxed environment [4].
Buster Sandbox Analyzer is a dynamic analysis tool that has been designed to
determine if processes exhibit malicious activities. In addition to analyzing the
behavior of the processes, it keeps track of the changes made to the system
such as registry changes, file-system changes and port changes [8]. The tool
runs inside a Sandbox which protects the system from getting infected while
executing the malware. The sandbox that is being used by Buster Sandbox
Analyzer is Sandboxie [38]. In this project, we use BSA to generate API calls
for win32 executables.
There are several other frameworks such as Detours, DynInst for Windows API
tracing. There are also several other tools that uses various approaches to trace Win-
dows API functions in-guest, some of which are mentioned above. And several tools
similar to Buster Sandbox Analyzer that are used to trace in sandboxed-environments
are CWSandbox and Norman Sandbox [15].
In the next chapter, we will see how these tools are used to collect data and other
implementation details of the project.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementation
In this chapter, we first give an overview of the malware dataset used in this
project. Then we elaborate on extraction of API call sequences and opcode se-
quences to be used in the project. In the final section of this chapter, we discuss
the implementation details of the project.
3.1 Chosen Dataset
The following seven different malware families were considered as malware
dataset for this project.
Trojan.Zbot also known as Zeus, is a trojan horse which compromises the system
by downloading configuration files or updates and attempts to steal confidential
information. It is a stealth virus which hides in the file system within moments
of execution. The virus vanishes from processes list and the most IDA Pro could
track the virus is for the initial 5 - 10 minutes of execution [47].
Trojan.ZeroAccess is also a trojan horse which makes use of an advanced rootkit to
hide itself. It is capable of creating a new hidden file system, create a backdoor
in the compromised system and download new malware [48].
Win32/Winwebsec is a rogue security software, that pretends to be an anti-virus
software. When infected, it displays fake messages showing malicious activity
and tricks the customers into paying money for the software to clean up the
system [51].
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Harebot.M is a backdoor which attempts to gain remote access of the infected
system and affects the productivity of the system and network. It attempts to
connect to other remote sites and awaits orders from these remote sites [24].
S.M.A.R.T HDD is similar to Winwebsec, also a fake rogue security software that
offers to do registry cleaning and malware removal. It starts a fake scanning
process and shows fake messages of detected trojan, viruses. And it does not
let the user to delete the detected viruses unless the user purchases the license
of the software [42].
Security Shield is similar to Winwebsec and Smarthdd. It is a Trojan where it
pretends to be a fake anti-virus software. It causes annoyance to users by
repeated fake virus detection messages and coerces the users into purchasing
the software [39].
Trojan.Cleaman is a trojan horse that arrives as an email attachment. It may use
an invalid digital certificate to pose as a legitimate file. It also infects itself into
all running processes. It checks network traffic and redirects the browser to a
remote IP address whenever the user requests a particular URL [46].
For the benign dataset, the dataset was collected from Windows System 32 files.
These files are present in every windows system and are used often. Some of the files
that are used in the benign set are notepad.exe, calc.exe, sort.exe, solitaire.exe etc.,.
Table 1 shows the number of files used from each family from the malware dataset.
All experiments in 4 were performed with the dataset present in the Table 1.
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Table 1: Malware Dataset
Family No. of Files
Zbot 200
ZeroAccess 200
Winwebsec 200
Harebot 49
Smarthdd 53
Security Shield 54
Cleaman 32
3.2 Observation Data : API call sequences
Microsoft Windows Operating System provides a variety of API calls that fa-
cilitate in requesting services from the kernel of the operating system [1]. Each
executable’s execution flow is analogous to its sequence of API calls. In the past,
information obtained from API calls has been used to study the behavior of malware.
3.2.1 Data Extraction
Each API call has a distinct name, a set of arguments and return value. We focus
only on API call names to construct the call sequence. The calls to Windows Applica-
tion Programming Interface (API) can be extracted from all executables dynamically
or statically. The extraction of an API call sequence for a particular malware has been
explained in the following sections. A sample partial extracted API call sequence for
a malware executable is shown in Listing 3.1.
Listing 3.1: Sample API call sequence
... OpenMutex CreateFile OpenProcessToken AdjustTokenPrivileges
SetNamedSecurityInfo LoadLibrary CreateFile GetComputerName
QueryProcessInformation VirtualAllocEx DeleteFile ...
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3.2.1.1 Dynamic Analysis
There are various tools to generate API call logs from an executable dynamically
as mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.4. In this Project, we use Buster Sandbox
Analyser(BSA) tool [8] to generate API calls by dynamic analysis. Buster Sandbox
Analyser uses a sandboxed environment to execute the malware and logs all API calls
for a certain duration of time. From the logged API reports, API calls are extracted
and merged together to form an API call sequence for each executable which is used
as observation data for training the HMM model. Listing 3.2 shows a sample API
log extracted via BSA.
Listing 3.2: Sample API log from BSA
...
QuerySystemInformation(SystemBasicInformation)
QuerySystemInformation(SystemProcessorInformation)
QueryProcessInformation (00
b6b7e3b923861ef8c257aa3803a239ce4d6154.exe ,
ProcessImageInformation)
VirtualAllocEx (00 b6b7e3b923861ef8c257aa3803a239ce4d6154.exe ,
MEM_COMMIT MEM_RESERVE , PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE , RegionSize =0
x00015500)
LoadLibrary(ole32.dll)
...
3.2.1.2 Static Analysis
For the static analysis part, IDA Pro was used for extracting API calls. An API
call set is usually obtained by Import Address Table(IAT) analysis which extracts
API information from the table that stores this information. To obtain an API call
sequence that is similar to the sequence obtained dynamically, we take a different
approach by disassembling the file and extracting the API calls in the same order as
it is present in the .asm file. The call instructions in a .asm file consist of subroutine
calls, API calls, near/far calls and several others out of which API calls are alone
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extracted which is constructed into a sequence. These extracted sequences obtained
by static analysis are used to test against the trained HMM Model.
3.3 Observation Data : Opcode sequences
Similar to API call sequences, opcode sequences have also been used widely in the
past for malware detection. Opcode sequences deals with the source code and when
used with HMM has proven to be effective for detection of metamorphic malware.
3.3.1 Data Extraction
Opcodes or operational codes are the portion of the assembly language instruc-
tion which specifies the operation. The following section explains extraction of opcode
sequences dynamically and statically. A sample opcode sequence that is extracted is
shown in the listing 3.3
Listing 3.3: Sample opcode sequence
... push mov call mov push call add mov pop retn push mov call
mov push call add mov pop ...
3.3.1.1 Dynamic Analysis
For Dynamic Analysis, Ether malware analysis tool and IDA Pro were used for
extraction of opcode sequences. Both tools generate an instruction trace log during
the execution of an executable from which the opcode sequence is constructed. In
Ether, a feature called instruction tracing was used to trace all instructions executed
in a log for a certain period of time. To perform instruction tracing in Ether, we
first execute the executable in the guest OS, and issue the command ether dom-id
instrtrace exe-file in the host OS where dom-id is the guest domain where the
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executable is running and exe-file is the process name that has to be traced. The
ether controller smartly sets a trap flag after execution of each instruction, hides
the debug exception evoked from the analysis target and logs the instruction which
prevents the executable to realize the presence of a debugger. The result is an accurate
log of executed instructions which is saved in the host OS. A sample section of the
ether instruction trace log is shown in Listing 3.4.
Listing 3.4: Sample instruction trace log from Ether
...
40fb9f: jmp 0x0040FB58
40fb58: mov [ebp -0x18], 0x00000000
40fb5f: lea eax , [ebp -0x18]
40fb62: push eax
40fb63: push [ebp -0x14]
40fb66: push edi
40fb67: call 0x00403DD8
...
Using IDA Pro, instruction trace logs are obtained for executables via the ‘Trac-
ing’ feature. After disassembling the executable, a breakpoint is placed at the entry
point of the program. Then, the instruction tracing feature is enabled. Several options
such as ‘trace over library functions’ etc can be enabled/disabled in Tracing Options.
The process then begins execution and logs each instruction that is being executed.
Since it writes each instruction the normal execution time cannot be compared with
the execution time in IDA Pro with ‘Instruction Tracing’ on.
A sample section of the IDA instruction trace log shown in Listing 3.5. Opcode
sequences are generated from the instruction trace log by extracting the opcodes in
the same ordering as it appears in an .asm file and merging them. These opcode
sequences are used as observation data for training the HMM model.
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Listing 3.5: Sample instruction trace log from IDA
...
00000 AB4 .text:start push ebp ESP=12 FF88
00000 AB4 .text:start +1 mov ebp , esp EBP=12 FF88
00000 AB4 .text:start +3 call sub_4011B0 ESP=12 FF84
00000 AB4 .text:sub_4011B0 push ebp ESP=12 FF80
00000 AB4 .text:sub_4011B0 +1 mov ebp , esp EBP=12 FF80
00000 AB4 .text:sub_4011B0 +3 sub esp , 2CCh ESP =12 FCB4 AF
=1 ZF=0
00000 AB4 .text:sub_4011B0 +9 push ebx ESP=12 FCB0
...
3.3.1.2 Static Analysis
To extract opcodes by static analysis, the executables are disassembled and a
seperate .asm file is generated for each executable. From the .asm files, opcodes are
extracted by a simple pattern matching script excluding macros, assembler directives
etc. The opcode sequences obtained by static analysis are used to score against the
trained model.
3.4 Training the HMM and scoring
For both API call sequences and opcode sequences, three cases were implemented
for comparison. The first is using dynamic analysis data alone for both training and
testing. The second case is using dynamic analysis data for training and static analysis
data for testing which is our proposed method. The third case is using static analysis
data alone for both training and testing. We already know that dynamic analysis
data is more accurate. We hope to see that when we train the model using dynamic
data, and test using only static data, we can augment the accuracy advantage of
dynamic case to the static case and hence hope to see that it is more accurate than
the static case alone. If we succeed to bring results, then not only our proposed
method will be more efficient than the dynamic case, but also more accurate than
the static case. We used the five-fold cross validation method for training and scoring
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the HMM. Each family is divided into five equal subsets. Four subsets are used for
training and one subset is used for testing the HMM along with the benign set. This
process is repeated five times till all five subsets are scored against the trained model.
The dataset used is as shown in Table 1.
3.4.1 Case 1: Training - Dynamic data, Testing - Dynamic data
In this case, we train the HMM with either API call sequences or opcode se-
quences of a single family obtained by dynamic analysis. The trained model is tested
against API call sequences or opcode sequences of the same family and benign set
obtained by dynamic analysis. The observation sequences used are extracted as men-
tioned in Section 3.2.1.1 and Section 3.3.1.1.
3.4.2 Case 2: Training - Static data, Testing - Static data
In this case, we train the HMM with either API call sequences or opcode se-
quences of a single family obtained by static analysis. The trained model is tested
against API call sequences or opcode sequences of the same family and benign set ob-
tained by static analysis. The observation sequences used are extracted as mentioned
in Section 3.2.1.2 and Section 3.3.1.2.
3.4.3 Case 3: Training - Dynamic data, Testing - Static data
In this case, we train the HMM with either API call sequences or opcode se-
quences of a single family obtained by dynamic analysis. The trained model is tested
against API call sequences or opcode sequences of the same family and benign set
obtained by static analysis. The observation sequences used for training are extracted
as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.1 and Section 3.3.1.1. The observation sequences used
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for testing are extracted as mentioned in Section 3.2.1.2 and Section 3.3.1.2. We men-
tion this case as dynamic/static case or the mixed case in this project which refers to
one and the same.
The results for the above three cases and the various experiments performed are
elaborated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments
In this chapter, we discuss about the experiments performed and discuss the
results. Table 2 shows the specifications of the host and the guest that was used
to perform dynamic analysis of malware executables using Buster Sandbox Analyzer
and IDA Pro and Table 3 shows the specifications of the host and guest used along
with Ether malware analysis tool.
Table 2: System Configuration
Host
Model Dell Inspiron 15
Processor Intel Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU T4300 @ 2.10GHz
RAM 4.00 GB
System Type 64-bit OS
Operating System Windows 7
Guest
Virtualization Software Oracle Virtual Box 4.3.16
Base Memory 512MB
System Type 32-bit OS
Operating System Windows XP
The experiments were performed with API call sequences and opcode sequences
as observation data for Hidden Markov Model. The effectiveness of each experiment
is assessed with the help of ROC Curves and AUC.
4.1 ROC curves and AUC as a performance measure
ROC curves are an effective way to visualize the performance of a machine learn-
ing classifier by varying the decision threshold [7]. This helps in comparison of various
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Table 3: System Configuration for Ether malware analysis tool
Host
Model Dell XPS
Processor Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M CPU @ 2.60GHz
RAM 6.00 GB
System Type 64-bit OS
Operating System Debian Lenny 5.0 Vanilla Install
Guest
Virtualization Software Xen Hypervisor 3.1.0
Kernel xen-linux-system-2.6.26-1-xen-amd64
Base Memory 512MB
System Type 32-bit OS
Operating System Windows XP
techniques with a single identifier which is the Area Under the Curve(AUC) calculated
from the ROC curve. ROC curves are plotted as two dimensional graphs with true
positive rate(TPR) also known as sensitivity in Y-axis and false positive rate(FPR)
also known as specificity in X-axis with varied thresholds. TPR is defined as the
number of true positives over the actual number of positives. FPR is defined as the
no. of false positives over the actual number of negatives. AUC is the area under
the ROC curve which is plotted in a unit square. Since, AUC is just a portion of
a unit square it can range from 0.5 to 1.0, 1.0 being the highest and 0.5 being the
lowest. The performance of a classification is excellent if the AUC is close to 1.0 and
considered a failure if the AUC is close to 0.5 [7, 21].
4.2 Discussion of results : Using API calls sequence
In this experiment, we train separate HMM models with API call sequences as
observation data obtained from seven different families. The training and testing data
is varied for all three cases as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. Table 4 shows
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the AUCs obtained for each of the cases.
Table 4: AUCs for API calls sequence
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static
Security Shield 0.9875 1.0000 0.9563
Zbot 0.9800 0.9936 0.9555
Winwebsec 0.9762 0.9647 0.7631
Smarthdd 0.9808 0.8225 0.7500
ZeroAccess 0.9968 0.9976 0.6526
Harebot 0.9867 0.8282 0.6321
Cleaman 1.0000 1.0000 0.5000
In the first column in Table 4, we have the dynamic/dynamic case where we train
the HMM using dynamically obtained data and test with the same. As expected, the
AUCs are closer to 1.0 for all families. In the second column, we have the AUCs
obtained for the static/static case. The accuracy has exceeded slightly for some
of the families and decreased for Smarthdd and Harebot families. Both of these
cases although having good results, have disadvantages practically. The first case
has execution overhead during the testing phase, while the second case can be easily
defeated by simple code obfuscation techniques like adding dead code that is similar
to benign files.
In the third column, we have the AUCs obtained by training HMM with dynamic
data and testing the trained model with static data. We expect to augment the
accuracy of the static case by having an accurate trained model with dynamic data.
We see that for the families Zbot and Security Shield the performance is very good.
The ROC Curve is shown in Figure 2.
Apart from Zbot and Security Shield, none of the other families have given good
results. Also, none of them have been able to exceed the static analysis case which was
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Figure 2: ROC for Security Shield-Dynamic/Static-API
the expected result. The reason being that, in each executable very less number(5 to
20) of API calls were obtained statically. When scored against a model trained with
different(dynamic) data, lack of data for testing might have led to inconsistent results.
Hence, we use opcode sequences in our next experiment instead of API call sequences.
HMM using opcode sequences has been very effective for malware detection in the
past.
4.3 Discussion of results : Using opcode sequence
In this experiment, we use opcode sequences for training and scoring the HMM
for three cases similar to the previous section as mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.
Initially for the first experiment, we use Ether malware analysis tool to obtain dy-
namic data and test using static data obtained from IDA Pro. Then in the second
experiment, we use IDA Pro for both dynamic and static data. Our third experi-
ment was based on the opcodes present only in dynamic data. We also experimented
on data collected for a longer duration of time during dynamic analysis. Although
not practical, we decided to perform the Static/Dynamic case too to obtain more
information on the mixed case. All the results obtained from the above mentioned
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experiments are discussed in the following sections.
4.3.1 Experiment 1: Ether/IDA Pro
Here, we use Ether malware analysis tool to generate opcode sequences from
the instruction trace logs that are generated during dynamic analysis as explained in
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.1. Ether malware analysis tool is an open source tool that has
been developed via hardware virtualization extensions, and resides completely outside
of the target OS. And hence, has the biggest advantage of having no problems with
in-guest detection. As already mentioned in Chapter 1, around 28 percent of malware
variants found in 2014 were virtual machine aware. They either quit abruptly as soon
as they realize the VM environment, or perform tasks similar to benign files to avoid
detection. Ether malware analysis tool smartly avoids detection and has total control
on invocation of debug exceptions. Hence, dynamic analysis in Ether generates near
to accurate logs with no incomplete or inaccurate emulation. We train the HMM
using data obtained from Ether malware analysis tool. And then test the model with
static data obtained from IDA Pro. The results obtained are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: AUCs for Ether/IDA opcode sequence
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static
Zbot 1.0000 0.6728 0.7767
The ROC curve for the mixed(dynamic/static) case corresponding to AUC 0.7767
is shown in Figure 3. From the results in Table 5, we see that the dynamic case does
very well. And the mixed case does pretty well and better than the static case. Also,
we learned that, since the dis-assembly by Ether and IDA are quite different, the
discrepancies might be affecting the results. Hence, we tried the next experiment
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Figure 3: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic(Ether)/Static(IDA)-Opcodes
with both dynamic and static data from IDA Pro.
4.3.2 Experiment 2: IDA/IDA
Here, we train the HMM using dynamic data obtained from IDA Pro. And then
test the model with static data obtained from IDA Pro. The instruction trace logs
were generated as explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.1. We first test for a small
subset of Zbot files. The results obtained are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: AUCs for IDA/IDA opcode sequence for a small subset
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static
Zbot 0.9650 0.5575 0.8525
From the above results we see that, the score for the mixed case(0.8525) has
improved than the Ether/IDA experiment where the score was 0.7767. The ROC
curve for the dynamic/static case is shown in Figure 4. Also, the mixed score is
better than that of the static case. Hence, we try the same for all families for a larger
dataset. The results are shown in Table 7.
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Figure 4: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic/Static-IDA-Opcodes
Table 7: AUCs for opcode sequence
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static
Smarthdd 0.9860 0.9952 1.0000
Zbot 0.9681 0.7755 0.6997
Cleaman 1.0000 0.8567 0.6889
Winwebsec 0.8268 0.6609 0.6064
Harebot 0.7210 0.5300 0.5961
Security Shield 0.9452 0.5028 0.5752
ZeroAccess 0.9840 0.7760 0.5600
From the results in Table 7, we see that we get a perfect score of 1.0 for Smarthdd
family for the mixed case. The ROC Curve for the Smarthdd family is shown in
Figure 5. But, the results for other families except Smarthdd family are not as
expected for the mixed case. This was mostly due to the fact that we obtain only
50 to 80 distinct opcodes during dynamic analysis. Whereas, we obtain 230 to 280
distinct opcodes from the .asm files. This was in contrast with the number of distinct
opcodes for Smarthdd family. Figure 6 shows the number of distinct opcodes obtained
for each family in both static and dynamic case. The number of distinct dynamic
opcodes for Smarthdd family was 34 and the number of distinct static opcodes was
81. The vast difference between the training set and testing set for other families
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might have contributed to inconsistent results. To test this, the next experiment was
performed by removing opcodes while scoring that is not present in the dynamic data
used for training. that is, all opcodes not seen prior by the trained model was skipped
while scoring.
Figure 5: ROC for Smarthdd-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure 6: Number of Distinct Opcodes
4.3.3 Experiment 3: Skipping unseen opcodes
The next experiment that we conducted was to make the data obtained from
static analysis to be similar to the training set. For example, for Zbot family, there
are 42 distinct opcodes in the dynamic data and 243 distinct opcodes in static data.
Hence, when the model is trained only for 42 observation symbols and tested with 243
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symbols, it encounters a large number of opcodes that is not seen before. This might
contribute to noise in the results. Hence, during scoring whenever HMM encounters
an unseen opcode, we skip the opcode. This experiment was performed for mixed
case alone for the families Zbot and ZeroAccess. The results obtained are shown in
Table 8. The column Experiment 2 in Table 8 has the scores from Section 4.3.2 and
column Experiment 3 has the scores obtained from the experiment in this section.
Table 8: AUCs for opcode sequence - Dynamic/Static - Skip unseen opcodes
Family Static Dynamic/Static
Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Smarthdd 0.9952 1.0000 1.0000
ZeroAccess 0.7760 0.5600 0.8970
Cleaman 0.8567 0.6889 0.7156
Winwebsec 0.6609 0.6064 0.7004
Zbot 0.7755 0.6997 0.6424
Security Shield 0.5028 0.5752 0.6212
Harebot 0.5289 0.5961 0.5694
Figure 7: ROC for ZeroAccess-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
From the results shown in Table 8, we see that for the ZeroAccess family, remov-
ing the unseen opcodes has a good effect on its score. The score has increased from
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0.5600 to 0.8970 and also has exceeded the static case with score 0.7760. The ROC
curve for ZeroAccess family is shown in Figure 7. The rest of the families, even if
they do not have a significant increase in score, families like Winwebsec and Security
Shield have improved from the scores obtained in Experiment 2 from Section 4.3.2
and exceed the static case. In each of these experiments, some malware families per-
form very well and some families don’t perform as expected. This inconsistency in
results was studied further and led to the next experiment.
4.3.4 Experiment 4: Training data from different time windows
The dynamic data generated using IDA was obtained by running each executable
for a duration of average 3 to 5 minutes. This duration does not represent the actual
duration of the execution rather, the duration IDA Pro takes to log the instructions
in the trace log. Since there is no clear way to determine the number of minutes an
executable has to run to collect data, and also since most of the malware complete
their infection process within the first one minute of their execution, an average 3
to 5 minutes was set for data collection. The same data was used for the dynamic
case too and the accuracy of the dynamic case has proved that the data collected is
sufficient enough to represent the behavior of a particular malware family to train
an HMM. But, in the dynamic/static case, since the model is trained with dynamic
data and tested with static data, the data collected might be partially representing
the behavior of the family as a whole, and when tested with static data, the gaps
might lead to inconsistencies in results. This led to the next experiment, where we
run each executable for a longer duration of time. Also, we tested if there is a change
in scores for each 10 minute window to see in which time frame does a family of
malware exhibit most malicious activity. The results obtained are shown in Table 9.
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Table 9: AUCs for opcode sequence - Dynamic/Static - Different time windows
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static
0-3min 0-40min - 0-3min 0-10min 10-20min 0-40min
Harebot 0.7210 0.8825 0.5289 0.5961 0.7559 0.7894 0.7690
Zbot 0.9676 0.9444 0.7000 0.7216 0.7576 0.7292 0.7600
Cleaman 1.0000 1.0000 0.8567 0.6889 0.6889 0.6556 0.7056
Figure 8: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-0-40min
From the results in Table 9, we see that the scores of Zbot increases from 0.6997
to 0.7600 for the mixed case but does not exceed the static case and decreases from
0.9676 to 0.9444 for the dynamic case. Whereas, for the Harebot family, the score has
improved from 0.5961 to 0.7690, has exceeded the static case which is 0.5289 and also
has shown considerable improvement for the dynamic case. For the Cleaman family,
there is slight increase in scores but does not exceed the static case. The ROC curve
for the Harebot family for the mixed case for 0-40 mins is shown in Figure 8.
4.3.5 Experiment 5: Static/Dynamic case
For the last experiment, we ran the Static/Dynamic case. In this experiment,
instead of training with dynamically obtained opcode sequences, we train using stat-
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ically obtained opcode sequences. Similarly, instead of testing with the static data
as we have previously seen, we test using the dynamic data. Although not practi-
cal, since testing with dynamic data is very costly, this experiment could give some
information on the mixed case. The vast difference between the number of distinct
opcodes were suspected to cause unexpected scores for the mixed case. The results
obtained are shown in Table 10.
Table 10: AUCs for opcode sequence - Static/Dynamic
Family Dynamic Static Dynamic/Static Static/Dynamic
Smarthdd 0.9860 0.9952 1.0000 0.9748
Zbot 0.9681 0.7755 0.6997 0.9525
Cleaman 1.0000 0.8567 0.6889 1.0000
Winwebsec 0.8268 0.6609 0.6064 0.6279
Harebot 0.7210 0.5300 0.5961 0.5832
Security Shield 0.9452 0.5028 0.5752 0.5928
ZeroAccess 0.9840 0.7760 0.5600 0.6890
From the results shown in Table 10, we can see that Smarthdd, Cleaman and
Zbot families show good scores. Zbot family has a score closer to 1.0 and Cleaman
family gives the perfect score of 1.0. The AUC curve for Zbot family is shown in
Figure 9. Zero Access family also shows increase in scores. The average number of
families giving good scores has definitely increased as compared to the Dynamic/Static
case. But, the rest of the families such as Security Shield, Winwebsec and Harebot
have similar scores to the Dynamic/Static case. This raises the question whether the
dynamic and static views are comparable in this manner for all the families.
From the results presented in above sections, we see that a few experiments
perform well for a few families but has not given expected results for all families of
malware. The distribution of opcodes for the Smarthdd family is very different from
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Figure 9: ROC for Zbot-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
the benign files and hence has given good scores in all experiments. The combined
ROC curves for the Smarthdd family is shown in Figure 10. For the ZeroAccess family,
lot of unseen opcodes have very small relative frequency but together sufficient enough
to cause noise. When the unseen opcodes are removed, the score drastically improved.
This can be seen in Figure 11. For the Harebot family, when the executables are run
for a longer duration of time, the score has improved. The combined ROC curve for
the Harebot family is shown in Figure 12. For the Cleaman and Zbot families, the
reverse of the Dynamic/Static case has given good scores. Security Shield and Zbot
presented good scores with API call sequences. And the Winwebsec family has shown
a slight increase in scores as compared to the static case when the unseen opcodes are
removed. In all the above experiments, the scores have slightly increased for various
families and in most cases have even exceeded the static case but have not shown a
significant increase or a trend that is generic to all families of malware. We discuss
the conclusion that we obtain from the experiments performed and possible future
work in Chapter 5.
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Figure 10: Combined ROC for Smarthdd
Figure 11: Combined ROC for ZeroAccess-Skip unseen opcodes
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Figure 12: Combined ROC for Harebot-0-40min
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
The purpose of this project is to come up with an efficient technique for mal-
ware detection that combines the advantages of both dynamic and static analysis.
Although, static analysis is simple, fast and practical, using dynamic analysis has
proven to give more accurate detection results than static analysis. By combining
both the analysis methods, we could get a feasible approach where we could get accu-
rate results with a learning model trained on dynamic data and gain speed by using
only static data for scoring.
From all the experiments performed in this project, we conclude that this ap-
proach has a lot more to be explored. There have been very good results for a few
families in each of the experiments but has not shown consistent results for all fami-
lies of malware. The reason might be because the dynamic and static views are very
different from each other and hence are incomparable the way it is being compared.
Also, using an Hidden Markov Model for training and testing with different data for
malware detection has not been attempted in the past.
For future work, a perfected approach with this base idea could be very helpful in
malware detection. We could combine the feature sets and apply SVM technique for
enhanced scores. Or we could focus on only the set of most frequently occurring(MFO)
opcodes or group the opcodes into similar sets to compensate the difference in opcodes
between static and dynamic views. We could try a variety of other machine learning
algorithms with different feature sets using the same base idea.
Since the learning model focuses on dynamic data which strips away one layer of
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obfuscation, the malicious activity is accurately captured by the trained model. New
malware variants of the same family with lots of code obfuscation techniques when
scored against this trained model is expected to stand out against a benign set which
will ensure a good detection accuracy.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A: ROC curves
A.1 Using API call sequence
Figure A.13: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic-API
Figure A.14: ROC for Zbot-Static-API
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Figure A.15: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-API
Figure A.16: ROC for ZeroAccess-Dynamic-API
Figure A.17: ROC for ZeroAccess-Static-API
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Figure A.18: ROC for ZeroAccess-Mixed-API
Figure A.19: ROC for Winwebsec-Dynamic-API
Figure A.20: ROC for Winwebsec-Static-API
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Figure A.21: ROC for Winwebsec-Mixed-API
Figure A.22: ROC for Smarthdd-Dynamic-API
Figure A.23: ROC for Smarthdd-Static-API
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Figure A.24: ROC for Smarthdd-Mixed-API
Figure A.25: ROC for Security Shield-Dynamic-API
Figure A.26: ROC for Security Shield-Static-API
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Figure A.27: ROC for Security Shield-Mixed-API
Figure A.28: ROC for Harebot-Dynamic-API
Figure A.29: ROC for Harebot-Static-API
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Figure A.30: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-API
Figure A.31: ROC for Cleaman-Dynamic-API
Figure A.32: ROC for Cleaman-Static-API
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Figure A.33: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-API
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APPENDIX B
Appendix B: ROC curves
B.1 Using opcode sequence - Ether/IDA
Figure B.34: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic-Ether/IDA-Opcodes
Figure B.35: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Ether/IDA-Opcodes
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Figure B.36: ROC for Zbot-Static-Ether/IDA-Opcodes
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B.2 Using opcode sequence - IDA/IDA - Small Subset
Figure B.37: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic-IDA/IDA-Opcodes
Figure B.38: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-IDA/IDA-Opcodes
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Figure B.39: ROC for Zbot-Static-IDA/IDA-Opcodes
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B.3 Using opcode sequence - IDA/IDA
Figure B.40: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.41: ROC for Zbot-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.42: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.43: ROC for ZeroAccess-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.44: ROC for ZeroAccess-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.45: ROC for ZeroAccess-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.46: ROC for Winwebsec-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.47: ROC for Winwebsec-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.48: ROC for Winwebsec-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.49: ROC for Smarthdd-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.50: ROC for Smarthdd-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.51: ROC for Smarthdd-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.52: ROC for Security Shield-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.53: ROC for Security Shield-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.54: ROC for Security Shield-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.55: ROC for Harebot-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.56: ROC for Harebot-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.57: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes
Figure B.58: ROC for Cleaman-Dynamic-Opcodes
Figure B.59: ROC for Cleaman-Static-Opcodes
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Figure B.60: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes
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B.4 Using opcode sequence - IDA/IDA - Skip unseen opcodes
Figure B.61: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
Figure B.62: ROC for ZeroAccess-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
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Figure B.63: ROC for Winwebsec-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
Figure B.64: ROC for Security Shield-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
Figure B.65: ROC for Smarthdd-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
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Figure B.66: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
Figure B.67: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes-Skip unseen opcodes
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B.5 Using opcode sequence - IDA/IDA - Different time windows
Figure B.68: ROC for Harebot-Dynamic-Opcodes-0-40min
Figure B.69: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-0-40min
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Figure B.70: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-0-10min
Figure B.71: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-10-20min
Figure B.72: ROC for Zbot-Dynamic-Opcodes-0-40min
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Figure B.73: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes-0-40min
Figure B.74: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes-0-10min
Figure B.75: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes-10-20min
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Figure B.76: ROC for Cleaman-Dynamic-Opcodes-0-40min
Figure B.77: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes-0-40min
Figure B.78: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes-0-10min
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Figure B.79: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes-10-20min
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B.6 Using opcode sequence - IDA/IDA - Static/Dynamic
Figure B.80: ROC for Zbot-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
Figure B.81: ROC for ZeroAccess-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
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Figure B.82: ROC for Winwebsec-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
Figure B.83: ROC for Security Shield-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
Figure B.84: ROC for Smarthdd-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
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Figure B.85: ROC for Harebot-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
Figure B.86: ROC for Cleaman-Mixed-Opcodes-Static/Dynamic
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